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Experimental induction of sad mood states is a mainstay of laboratory research on affect and
cognition, mood regulation, and mood disorders. Typically, the success of such mood
manipulations is reported as a statistically significant pre- to post-induction change in the selfrated intensity of the target affect. The present commentary was motivated by an unexpected
finding in one of our studies concerning the response rate to a well validated sad mood induction.
Using the customary statistical approach, we found a significant mean increase in self-rated
sadness intensity with a moderate effect size, verifying the “success” of the mood induction.
However, that “success” masked that, between one-fifth and about one-third of our samples
(adolescents who had histories of childhood-onset major depressive disorder and healthy controls)
reported absolutely no sadness in response to the mood induction procedure. We consider
implications of our experience for emotion research by (1) commenting upon the typically
overlooked phenomenon of non-response, (2) suggesting changes in reporting practices regarding
mood induction success, and (3) outlining future directions to help scientists determine why some
subjects do not respond to experimental mood induction.
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Introduction:
A Surprising Finding
Experimental induction of sad mood states is a mainstay of laboratory research on the
interface of affect and cognition, mood regulation, and mood disorders (Martin, 1990). In
our recent study of how adolescents with a history of major depressive disorder (and normal
controls) regulate sad mood (Kovacs et al, 2015), we encountered an unexpected result with
our sad mood induction, a 163-second clip from The Champ, which depicts a boy’s
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immediate reactions to the death of a loved one. The Champ clip has been a mainstay of
sadness induction in the field of affective science and has been extensively used with
pediatric and adult samples (e.g., Gross & Levenson, 1995; Rottenberg, Gross, Wilhelm,
Najmi, & Gotlib, 2002). Further, prior to selecting the Champ clip, we did extensive pilot
studies that compared it with alternative film clips (Kovacs et al, 2015, on-line appendix). It
was absolutely essential for our study that subjects report sadness after the induction
procedure, because our research question concerned how youth take advantage of specific
opportunities to repair sadness (i.e., we could not determine whether a youth succeeded at
mood repair unless there was sad mood to repair).

Author Manuscript

When we used the customary approach to determine the success of the mood induction
procedure, all appeared well. A repeated measures ANOVA on self-ratings of sadness
revealed that, after watching the Champ clip, sadness increased in the overall sample with a
moderate effect size. However, another result lurked: A simple frequency count revealed that
one-fifth of the emotionally healthy, control adolescents, and somewhat more than one-third
of the adolescents with childhood-onset depression histories, reported absolutely no sadness
in response to our induction procedure (Kovacs et al., 2015).

Author Manuscript

Searching for whether our rates of nonresponse were unusual, we found that very few
articles actually reported response rates to mood inductions in their samples. And, in the
literature as a whole, we found strikingly little discussion of mood induction failure. Given
the critical importance of successful sad mood induction across a number of research areas,
these seemed to be important gaps in the literature that made us pause and reflect. In the
present article, we first consider the history of mood induction success and the implications
of nonresponse. Second, we discuss the need to improve scientific reporting conventions for
mood inductions and propose alternatives. Finally, we call for future research to better
understand why some participants will not respond to even the most robust mood
manipulation procedures.

Author Manuscript

Historical Background: How to Define Mood Induction Success?—How do we
judge the success of a sad mood manipulation in the laboratory? Historically, most
definitions of a sad mood induction success consider to what extent a sample on average
reports a statistically significant change in the targeted affect. This change may be withinsubjects, such as a pre- to post-induction intensity ratings of a target affect, or a betweensubjects metric post-induction across-group differences in ratings of the target affect, or less
commonly, a predetermined percentage point change in affect intensity from pre- to postinduction (Martin, 1990). By such metrics, induction techniques for various affects have
been judged to succeed from 50% to 75% of the time, and the general conclusion in the field
has been that most experimental mood induction techniques are “effective” (Martin, 1990;
Gerrards-Hesse, Spies, & Hesse, 1994; Westermann, Spies, Stahl, & Hesse, 1996). Film
clips or stories have often been seen as among the strongest induction approaches, based on
narrative (Rottenberg, Ray, & Gross, 2007) and meta-analytic reviews (Westermann, Spies,
Stahl, & Hesse, 1996; but see Zhang et al., 2014). Effect sizes for sad mood induction via
films/stories have been reported to range from medium to large, partly depending on the
instructions provided to subjects (Westermann et al., 1996). Using individual change scores,
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Gerrards-Hesse et al (1994) concluded that sadness induction was effective for about 70% of
the cases, but the estimates varied wildly from 30% to 93%.
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Despite decades of research using mood induction, and major reviews focusing specifically
on the issue of its efficacy (i.e., Lench et al., 2011), the field has moved away from reporting
success rates or the actual distribution of scores. Indeed, since reviews conducted in the
1990s, (Martin, 1990; Gerrards-Hesse et al., 1994; Westermann, et al., 1996), there has been
scant notice of the phenomenon of nonresponse. We thus had difficulty judging whether our
rates of non-response to mood induction were all that unusual. Further, the reports that we
did locate used varying definitions of non-response. For instance, in two studies, 18%
(Singer & Dobson, 2009) and 14% (Singer & Dobson, 2007) of remitted depressed adults
exhibited a poor response to negative mood induction, based on an à priori defined
percentage change in affect rating. In another study, response was defined as a rating of at
least 3 on a 1–9 point intensity scale: 22% of the depressed but none of the remitted
depressed adults were deemed to be nonresponders to a sad film (Werner-Seidler & Moulds,
2012). Further, in a sample of normal adolescents, in vivo peer rejection (used for mood
induction) elicited a response, defined as “marked deterioration in state mood” or a reliable
change (reliable change RC, see Christensen and Mendoza, 1986) only in 38.1% of the
youths (Reijntjes et al., 2006). In contrast, using multiple sadness induction techniques, and
defining a response as mouse clicks in a predetermined negative region of an “affect grid,”
response rates of close to 95% also have been reported (Larcom & Isaacowitz, 2009).
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Because lack of a uniform definition of a “response” makes it difficult to compare nonresponse rates and related findings across studies, we suggest two standardized options.
First, non-responders can be defined as those participants not reporting any of the target
affect subsequent to the mood manipulation: this is the approach we used. This definition of
nonresponse has two advantages: it is clear-cut, and it acknowledges that some subjects may
already have the required mood, irrespective of the induction. However, some contexts will
require a different definition. In particular, studies that hinge upon demonstrating the effects
of mood manipulation (rather than just the presence of the required mood) should define
non-responders as those participants who do not report any increase in the target affect
subsequent to the manipulation. This particular definition would exclude those cases who
report none of the target affect and those who report either unchanged or decreased levels of
the target affect from baseline to the manipulation. Some investigators have proposed using a
certain percent-change in affect self-rating as the criterion of response to a mood
manipulation. However, unless the magnitude of change is germane to a particular study,
there is no clear standard for what percent of change should define a responder.
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Why Should We Be Concerned about Nonresponse?—We have no doubt that our
experience, in which one out of five participants failed to report any reaction to a mood
induction, is atypical. What are the implications for the field? Why should we be concerned?
One concern is that current practices may provide a misleading picture of our experimental
induction methods: By reporting only mean level change, many scientific reports leave the
impression of robust sad mood manipulation: A manipulation is judged to have worked
when it may have worked only for some participants. Therefore, current reporting practices
may camouflage methodologically weak procedures.
Cogn Emot. Author manuscript; available in PMC 2019 May 01.
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A related concern is that different samples are likely to vary considerably in rates of nonresponse. But since nonresponse is rarely reported, this source of between-study
heterogeneity will remain hidden from investigators. Given the centrality of sad mood
manipulation to studies that examine the correlates of sadness, the presumed heterogeneity
in response rates represents error variance, and, ultimately makes it less likely that findings
are replicable across samples. This issue is particularly acute in light of recent attention on
problems in replicating results in the field of psychology (Open Science Collaboration,
2015).

Author Manuscript
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Third, the hidden group of non-responders may lead to misinterpretations of research
findings. To give one example, Sheppard-Sawyer, McNally, and Fischer (2000) induced sad
mood with a film in a sample of restrained and unrestrained eaters and then used the
standard manipulation check to verify mood induction success. These authors reported that
restrained eaters showed greater increases in popcorn consumption than unrestrained eaters
after the sad film, a finding that has implications for how eating disorders develop.
Alternatively, if unrestrained eaters were simply less likely to respond to mood induction,
affective reactivity rather than restraint may be the explanatory variable (e.g., people who do
not react to the induction will not alter their popcorn consumption). Similarly, Williams et al
(2015) reported that formerly depressed subjects with a history of suicide attempts displayed
a greater deterioration of problem solving following a Velten mood manipulation than did
formerly depressed subjects with no history of suicide attempts or healthy controls. Nonresponse to mood manipulation was not reported. Thus, it is conceivable that the groups that
exhibited less deterioration of problem solving were more likely to be non-responders to the
mood induction. If the Williams et al (2015) findings were not due to differential behavior
responses to the same mood, but instead represent different responses to mood induction, the
treatment implications of the results would differ from those proposed by the authors.
Importantly, it may be inappropriate to include in some study samples those subjects who
report no sad mood. For example, if an investigator is examining the effects of induced sad
mood on another construct (whether it be attention, memory, or amygdala activation), any
viable interpretation of the results is predicated on the presence of sad mood. Logically,
then, participants who do not report experiencing that mood do not belong in the study. In
our study cited earlier, it would not have been possible to make inferences about subjects’
skills at repairing sad mood if the subjects did not first experience some degree of sadness.

Author Manuscript

What Should Be Done? Implications for the Field of Emotion Research—
Although this article has specifically focused on sad mood induction, and the largely hidden
nature of nonresponse, the implications apply broadly to affect induction, and highlight the
need for change in emotion science practices. First, we suggest changes in contemporary
reporting practices. The prevailing convention regarding how mood manipulation success is
reported —the mean change across a sample — is insufficient. We recommend that
investigators adopt our definitions of nonresponse and report its rates. Descriptors of the
score distributions also should be reported to facilitate across-study comparisons. When
possible, the reports should include hit rates; the hit rate is the proportion of the sample that
reports the targeted affect to a greater degree than some non-targeted affect (Gross &
Levenson, 1994). Such information corrects the overreliance on the mean response for
Cogn Emot. Author manuscript; available in PMC 2019 May 01.
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validity checks; it also provides a critical basis for comparing findings across studies, which
is particularly pressing when sadness induction continues to be a popular experimental
manipulation (Rottenberg, Ray, & Gross, 2007; Schaefer, Nils, Sanchez, & Philippot, 2010).
Once it becomes routine to report non-response rates, it will be possible to use meta-analysis
to determine which types of mood inductions minimize them (e.g., films, music) and how
non-response is influenced by methodological factors (e.g., duration of the induction).
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Second, there should be efforts to reduce non-response rates by introducing procedural
changes to mood induction. For example, some investigators have altered the duration of
mood induction so that the experiment continues only when subjects report achieving a
specific mood severity criterion (Liotti et al. 2000). Although this may reduce non-response
rates, different participants are likely to need different “doses” of mood inductions to reach
the same threshold (which could be problematic for certain research questions). Moreover,
requiring a certain level of affect intensity to be present before the experiment can proceed
carries with it an increased risk of experimental demand, perhaps to unacceptable levels.
However, even subtle changes to instructions may reduce nonresponse rates. For example,
for film viewing, some studies have altered the typical “watch” instructions by telling
subjects to put themselves in the scene or the role of the protagonist (e.g., Werner-Seidler &
Moulds, 2012). Nonresponse also may be minimized by combining mood induction
procedures, such as listening to depressogenic music while engaging in sad self-statements
(Larcom & Isaacowitz, 2009F). Finally, investigators may consider different kinds of stimuli
entirely, such as personally-tailored, sad stimuli (e.g., recall of one’s worst life moments), as
a strategy to combat non-response (e.g., Rottenberg, Gross, & Gotlib, 2005)

Author Manuscript

Given that non-responders are likely to persist, even with the most robust procedures, sound
statistical analyses are the final type of countermeasure. We believe that the simplest
remedy, to delete non-responders to mood induction from the analyses, is often the best
(e.g., Werner-Siedler & Moulds, 2012). However, if authors want to retain subjects who fail
to respond to mood induction, we recommend that: (a) the decision be justified, (b)
nonresponse rates be reported, and (c) an additional categorical ( yes, no) variable be
included in statistical models to account for the variance associated with nonresponse.
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Finally, it may be time to think more broadly about how we validate mood inducing stimuli.
Historically, validation studies and experiments typically have prioritized the subjective selfrated component of affective experience as the criterion of successful mood induction (e.g.,
Zhang, Hui, & Barrett, 2014). However, eliciting a mood also can be expected to induce
changes in cognition, physiology, and/or behavior (Lench, Flores, & Bench 2011). Thus, a
more stringent validation of mood induction success might require converging evidence
from several response systems (i.e., behavioral change and changes in subjective experience)
in a given subject. Indeed, bolstering the need for multi-method verification, low
correspondences are often observed between affective response domains (Mauss et al.,
2005). Thus, mood inductions that are “successful” via the criterion of subjective experience
may fail to systematically alter mood-related physiology, cognition, and/or behavior.
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Towards an Understanding of Nonresponse—In this comment, we have approached
nonresponse to sadness induction as a methodological problem in research. But it is equally
important to understand why nonresponse occurs in the first place, which then raises both
methodological and substantive issues. That is, nonresponse to sadness is not only “nuisance
variance” but may reveal important individual differences in affect processing (Brenner,
2000). Indeed, some subjects will not evidence a response to any mood induction procedure,
no matter how robust it is. Future work must be directed to gain a better (systematic)
understanding of how best to characterize these non-responders.
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Several factors may contribute to nonresponse. For instance, if the sad stimulus depicts loss
and grief in a protagonist, then difficulties with empathy and/or perspective taking (poor
socioemotional functioning) may explain non-response of some participants. Apparent
nonresponse in other participants may reveal a lack of insight into or monitoring of internal
states, as is seen in conditions such as alexithymia (Taylor, Bagby, & Parker, 1991), or
among subjects high in trait avoidance of negative experiences (e.g., experiential avoidance,
Kashdan et al., 2006). Nonresponse to mood induction may also reflect differences in
reporting biases, as when participants may experience but are unwilling to report negative
affect because of reasons such as embarrassment. Finally, nonresponse to sad mood
induction may reflect individual differences in central nervous system processes, such as
hypoactivity of subcortical structures (Kielhl et al., 2001).

Author Manuscript

To provide an illustration of the kinds of analyses that might be useful, we return to our
preliminary efforts to characterize nonresponders in our sample of adolescents. Our analyses
(reported in supplementary material) controlled for key variables and examined the potential
roles of clinical and physiological variables. A clinically useful finding was that youths with
depression histories and comorbid conduct/oppositional disorders were more likely to be
nonresponders to sadness induction than those without such comorbidities, possibly because
the sad stimulus film required the ability to empathize. In the physiological domain, we
found preliminary evidence that atypical profiles of respiratory sinus arrhythmia (RSA), an
index of the functioning of the autonomic nervous system, were associated with nonresponse
to mood induction (Yaroslavsky, Rottenberg, & Kovacs, 2013). Because RSA has been
implicated in attention deployment (Suess, Porges, & Plude, 1994), nonresponse to sadness
induction could mirror impaired attention to stimuli with sad affective content.

Author Manuscript

Finally, we note that our entire sample, including our nonresponders, consisted of
adolescents. Along with Reijntjes et al. (2006), the high rates of nonresponse in our study
raise the question as to whether some (or all) adolescent age groups may be particularly
“resistant” to sad mood induction. Such a possibility, and reasons for it, also warrant further
study, and underscore the importance of incorporating a developmental perspective in future
work on the phenomenon of nonresponse to sadness induction.
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Appendix I Supplementary Analyses
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Respiratory sinus arrhythmia (RSA) was assessed as an indicator of parasympathetic
nervous system functioning, which is a component of the ANS (Thayer & Lane, 2009). The
ANS is generally intertwined with emotion experience (Kreibig, 2010; Levenson, 2014) and
RSA, in particular, has been implicated in the modulation of emotional arousal (Dywan,
Mathewson, Choma, Rosenfeld, & Segalowitz, 2008; Thayer & Lane, 2009), social
engagement (Porges, 2007), and empathy among youths (Diamond, Fagundes, &
Butterworth, 2012; Eisenberg et al., 1996). RSA mirrors heart rate variability (HRV) at the
respiration frequency. It was assessed via the electrocardiogram (ECG) by means of sensors
in a modified Lead II configuration, while subjects were at rest (resting RSA) and while they
watched the sad film clip (RSA reactivity). ECGs were sampled online at 1000Hz and
processed using best-method approaches (see Bernston et al., 1997; Yaroslavsky et al, 2014).
RSA was defined as the log transformed high frequency (HF) power band of HRV (.15-.04
Hz range).
Nonresponders to sadness induction were characterized by lower resting RSA than
responders (b=−.25, t[366]=2.12, p=.035), but did not significantly differ in RSA reactivity
to the sad film (b=−.16, t[363]=1.61, p=.109). Given that combinations of resting and
reactive RSA (RSA patterns) predict aspects of adjustment above and beyond individual
RSA metrics (Graziano & Derefinko, 2013; Hinnant & El-Sheikh, 2009; 2013; Yaroslavsky,
Rottenberg, & Kovacs, 2013; Yaroslavsky et al., 2014), we also examined whether RSA
patterns were related to nonresponse status. Indeed, RSA patterns predicted the likelihood of
nonresponse at a trend level (b=−.18, χ2 [1] = 3.33, p=.068).
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Because nonresponders were disproportionately probands (youths with depression histories),
we considered whether emotion context insensitivity (ECI) might explain nonresponse
among them. According to ECI theory, depression diminishes all context-appropriate
affective responses (Rottenberg, Gross, & Gotlib, 2005). We therefore examined subjects’
self-reports of affect in response to a happy film clip, which was the last stimulus in the
experimental protocol. The film (Mr. Bean) has been used in prior studies (e.g., Joormann &
Siemer, 2004) and also was pre-tested by us (Kovacs et al., submitted for publication). After
watching the Mr. Bean clip, 93% of the probands and 100% of the controls reported some
degree of happiness (ratings ≥1 for “happy” on a 0–7 scale). Further, from among the
probands who failed to respond emotionally as expected to the sad film, only 13% ALSO
failed to respond appropriately to the happy film clip. All in all, these findings suggest that
the reported absence of appropriate affective response to the sad film among many probands
was specific to that stimulus and did not generalize across contexts.

Author Manuscript

Might nonresponse reflect an empathy deficit?
Confirmation that the lack of appropriate affective response among many probands was
specific to the sad film led us to consider a further explanation for it. Because the film clip
depicted a scene of personal loss and grief, feeling sad after watching it is likely to be
contingent on some degree of empathy with the clip’s protagonist.
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We did not have a direct measure of empathy but wondered if a history of comorbid
oppositional defiant or conduct disorder (ODD/CD) could serve as a proxy for empathy
deficit (these diagnoses tend to be associated with low levels of empathy). In this study,
psychiatric disorders were diagnosed by trained clinicians, based on standardized, semistructured interviews with the adolescent and a parent (who also informed about the
adolescent) using DSM-IV criteria (American Psychiatric Association, 2000) and consensus
decisions ( see Tamas et al, 2007). We found a trend for ODD/CD diagnoses to be
overrepresented among nonresponder probands, compared to those probands who reported
some degree of sadness (22% versus 13%, respectively; χ2 [1] = 3.72, p=.054). Thus,
diminished empathy, as represented by ODD/CD diagnoses, may partially account for
nonresponse to sad mood induction.
Which individual differences variables best predict nonresponse?

Author Manuscript
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Finally, we examined the extent to which the above noted variables together explained
nonresponse to sadness induction. We regressed nonresponder status (yes vs. no) on sex
(male vs. female), proband status (proband vs. control), behavior disorder diagnostic status
(presence vs. absence of CD/ODD) and main- and interaction effects of RSA, while
controlling for age. In this multivariate setting, sex did not predict responder status.
However, independent of other variables, probands continued to be over-represented among
the nonresponders (OR = 1.99, p =.009, 95% CI 1.19 – 3.33), with a trend for subjects with
a behavior disorder diagnosis also to be over-represented (OR = 2.03, p=.084, 95% CI 0.91
4.53). While there were no significant main effects for the two RSA indices, their interaction
did predict sadness nonresponse at a trend level (t = 1.86, p =.064). Post-hoc probes revealed
that an atypical pattern involving low resting RSA and RSA augmentation, which has been
associated with behavior problems (Hinnant & El-Sheikh, 2009; 2013), predicted
nonresponder status. It therefore appears that certain individual differences variables
contribute to lack of response to sadness induction in youths.
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